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21. Introduction
1.1. Background for this study
Oil is a crucial resource for the world. It is not renewable, and it is not of
easy access.
Accessing to oil resources is not just a concern of Countries and
governments. It is crucial also for oil companies, since it is at the basis of
their production activity, and for the entire world, since energy demand is
still increasing, despite a temporary decrease due to the economic crisis we
are going through.
Traditional oil resources are getting fewer and less, making it difficult for oil
companies to guarantee the basis of their business. The Norwegian
Continental Shelf is an example of production that after decades of
uninterrupted growth has reached the top and will start declining in the next
years. Quoting KonKraft rapport (Summary of KonKraft report 2,
“Production development on the Norwegian Continental Shelf” page 3,
available at www.konkraft.no) “Overall production of oil and gas on the
NCS has reached plateau at a daily rate of four to 4.5 million barrels of oil
equivalent (boe). It is expected to remain at this level for the next seven
years. Around 2015, however, overall oil and gas production is expected to
start declining.”
This concern is confirmed by the 2007 resources report of the Norwegian
Petroleum Directorate.
3Fig 1, from the 2007 Resource Report of the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate,
available at http://www.npd.no/English/Produkter+og+tjenester/
Publikasjoner/Ressursrapporter/2007/ress_kap4.htm
Declining reserve quantity is not the only challenge for oil companies.
After a past where environmental issues were not considered, it is now
becoming more and more necessary to operate in a environmentally
sustainable way. Oil companies must find solutions that reduce
environmental impact as much as possible. It is a matter of environmental
awareness, but it is often also a question of formal requirements from reserve
holding States.
So, oil companies shall increase production on the basis of increasingly
scarce resources, and do all this in a not polluting way.
In this picture, it is clear the importance of the discovery of new fields.
Another big challenge is reaching these new fields before competitors. The
increasing number of oil companies makes competition harder. Old and new
operators must deal with an intense competition for access to resources.
As a result, oil companies try to expand themselves to gain access to new
geographic areas and to more reserve holding States.
4In the last years, we have seen strong interest toward the potential reserves of
the Arctic region. There have been many exploration activities in the area,
with some good results. The Barents Sea is a geographically small area, but it
has a big potential. Goliat is located in this region, and is at the centre of the
attention of local society and oil companies because it is the first important
case of oil production in the Barents Sea. The development of this project
could indicate the way for the future of the development of the entire area
and Northern Norway, and for oil production in the Barents and Arctic Sea.
Also in the case of new areas exploration, IOCs must deal with the presence
of local national oil companies. Usually established by governments, NOCs
have of course privileged access to local resources.
International oil companies (IOCs) can penetrate new markets by offering to
collaborate with local NOCs.
On the other hand, NOCs are usually interested in partnerships with IOCs for
reasons like lack of expertise and ambitions of international expansion.
The number of strategic alliances between oil companies has increased in the
last years. Green and Keogh (2000) mention that the first CRINE (Cost
Reduction Initiative for the New Era) report invited oil industry to a shift in
interaction methods, in a period when the industry started realising “that
adversarial relationships not only added to its (i.e. industry’s) costs but also
threatened its continued existence”. This tendency “accelerated after 1992
(…). The majority of the oil and gas companies and their contractors now
embrace, at least partially, a more collaborative style of working” (Green
and Koegh, “Collaboration in the upstream oil and gas industry” Strategic
Change, June 2000, page 250 and 251, Copyright 2000 John Wiley & Sons)
Newman and Chaharbaghi confirm that “In fast-moving markets alliances
are becoming a norm as the level of conflict is minimized by partners
recognizing that they are the only vehicle for minimizing risk associated with
market and technology uncertainty” (Newman and Chaharbaghi, “Strategic
alliances in fast-moving markets”, copyright 1996 Elsevier Science Ltd)
5Companies are therefore motivated to collaborate with competitors. These
motivations can for example be reducing risk, large-scale advantage,
technology complementarities, competitive advantage and access barriers,
overcoming barriers, exploiting local resources, accessing to resources
(Nygaard, Alliansebygging, Fagbokforlaget, 2007, page 25).
There are different forms of collaboration. Companies choose which one to
adopt according to their competitive and organisational strategy. Nygaard
(2007, page 20) considers three main types.
MARKET CONTRACTS INTERNAL ORG
Fig 2, from Nygaard (2007), page 25
The choice of which form to adopt depends on the competitive strategy of
the companies, but also on the organisational one, since also organisation
could be affected by strong models of partnership like merging. Contract or
market forms have less impact on internal organisation.
The competitive strategy of the company depends on internal factors, which
are the strengths and the weaknesses of the same company, and on external
factors, which are the competitive forces of the market.
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6Different internal and external factors bring to different competitive
strategies and therefore to different alliance forms.
This paper will analyse the connections between competitive forces in the
market and competitive strategy, and between competitive strategies and
strategic alliances.
The collaboration between Eni and Statoilhydro in the oilfield Goliat will be
the study case. We will investigate it mainly from Eni’s perspective, but we
will consider also the role and interests of Statoilhydro. An alliance is based
on more partners, and has its scope in bringing benefit to all of them. The
bases of collaboration are the common and/or complementary interests of the
parts. If it is possible to concentrate on one partner’s perspective, it is also
necessary to keep in mind that an alliance is such because more companies
joined together as a part of their competitive strategy.
1.2. Objective of this study
We will see that alliances are the strategy that International Oil Companies
use for replacing their reserves, and for staying competitive in a fast-moving
market like oil&gas industry.
International oil companies own less than 10% of world oil reserves (Jaffe
and Soligo 2007). The rest is owned by reserve holding Countries and their
national companies. These last ones have risen to high level of technology
and operations, while in the past their operating role had a minor relevance.
Reserve holding Countries had no possibility of exploiting their own
reserves, and welcomed international oil companies (IOCs). Without the
intervention of IOCs, many reserve holding Countries would not have
managed developing a market for their resources.
7In the last decade this situation has changed. National oil companies (NOCs)
have become strong and competent operators, and reserve holding Countries
have had less and less need for IOCs.
Replacing reserves is a crucial issue for IOCs, and the rise of NOCs, together
with a decline in world oil reserves, is making it increasingly difficult.
Strategic alliances with NOCs are the mechanism that allows IOCs to have
access to oil reserves. Understanding more about how IOCs develop strategic
alliances means understanding an important strategy IOCs practise for
replacing their oil reserves.
We will see that strategic alliances realise, putting them together, the
competitive strategies of IOCs and NOCs. IOCs need to replace reserves, and
NOCs need to develop expertise and a network for international expansion.
In other cases, strategic alliances help IOCs keeping competitive advantage
in costs and knowledge leadership. It is usually the case of alliances with
Independent Oil Companies, or with the few NOCs that own special
technology know-how, like Statoilhydro as case of deep-water technology
specialist.
In a published speech, taken in occasion of the International Oil Summit in
Paris in April 2006, Malcolm Brinded, executive director exploration &
production of Royal Dutch Shell, talked about the shared interests of NOCs
and IOCs, and of his belief in the necessity of IOCs and NOCs working
together. He said “We (IOCs) can also offer links to markets, particularly for
gas; and experience of transferring technology, helping to develop national
staff and national capabilities” (Malcom Brinded, “NOCs and IOCs:
partners with shared interests”, International Oil Summit, Paris, April 2006)
Again, we emphasise that alliances derive from complementary scopes. The
complementary reasons in most of O&G alliances are, on IOCs side, the need
for replacing reserves, and, on NOCs side, the need for expertise or
international positioning. Research and interviews conducted by Valerie
8Marcel and Yihe Xu on behalf of KPMG International in 2008 show that the
main concern for NOCs’ managers are “lack of skilled personnel” and
“declining domestic reserves” (KPMG, “Key issues for Rising National Oil
Companies”, KPMG International, June 2008, page 11, available at
http://www.kpmg.co.za/images/surveys/key%20issues%20for%20national%
20oil%20companies.pdf)
A common scope is large-scale effect. In the last years (Nygaard,
“Alliansebygging” Fagbokforlaget 2007, page 34) we have seen alliances not
only at joint venture level, but also in the form of merging, like Exxon and
Mobil.
Gordon and Stenvoll’s study states, “among the NOCs pursuing a significant
international investment strategy, Statoil may be uniquely prepared to make
this transition” (Gordon and Stenvoll, “Statoil, a study in political
entrepreneurship” The James A.Baker III Institute for Public Policy, Rice
University, March 2007, page 41)
In absence of collaboration between these two parts, IOCs would have
difficult or not access to reserve holding Countries’ markets, which would be
dominated by their own NOCs. On the other hand, if a NOC did not share
any partnership with IOCs, it would hardly develop any know-how, it would
probably have a serious lack of human resources, and would miss any chance
of international expansion.
We will investigate the reasons behind strategic alliances, studying the
connections between competitive forces in the market and competitive
strategies, and between competitive strategies and strategic alliances.
We will analyse the alliance from a IOCs perspective but, in order to
understand if IOCs are able to continue practising collaboration as a strategy,
we must also consider what IOC can really offer to NOCs. In other words,
we ask ourselves if IOCs are able to add real value to NOCs operations.
9The study case will be the Goliat field in the Barents Sea, the first real
project of oil production in the Barents area. Eni is the operator, in alliance
with Statoilhydro.
Understanding the future possibilities of the strategy of alliances and
cooperation means understanding the future of IOCs and of the energy
market.
1.3. Methodology
We organised our work in theoretic analysis of strategic alliances,
competitive advantage and competitive strategies, and the analysis of the
oil&gas market, basing ourselves on relevant literature.
In the analysis of the market, we focused on IOCs’ perspective, and
considered other oil companies as elements of the market.
We made a short data analysis of data about Norwegian Continental Shelf
production licences as a support for our conclusions. From Norwegian
Petroleum Directorate webpage, we considered a sample of 99 licences (from
nr 200 to nr 299) and listed licensees for each licence.
We sorted the here-included 57 active licences in 7 groups, according to the
type of owner(s).
• one IOC
• one NOC, in this case Statoil
• one or more Independent Oil Companies
• a partnership of IOC and NOC
• a partnership of IOC and Independent Oil Company
• a partnership of NOC and Independent Oil Company
• a partnership of IOC, NOC and Independent Oil Company
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For the study case about Goliat, we gathered information from Norwegian
press and from Eni’s website.
For the analysis of Eni’s strategies, we have based ourselves on the website
of the company, and more particularly on the pages regarding Eni’s strategy
and risk management, and on Eni’s statistics about reserves and production.
1.4. Description of problem and main questions
We will study the reasons behind strategic alliances.
The main elements of the study will be
• The competitive forces in the oil&gas market
• The competitive strategies of the oil&gas companies
• The strategic alliances
• The partners in the alliance, i.e. oil companies.
When considering oil companies, we will concentrate on International Oil
Companies (IOCs).
National Oil Companies (NOCs) will recur in the study, but will not be a real
object of research.
For defining IOCs and NOCs, we refer to Jaffe and Soligo, “International
Oil Companies” The James A.Baker III Institute for Public Policy, Rice
University, 2007, page 17
“The distinction between IOCs and NOCs is not always clear-cut since, over
time, some NOCs such as BP, Total and ENI S.pA. have been privatized —or
substantially privatized—so that they behave in ways that are similar to firms
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that have always been in the private sector. And there are firms such as
StatoilHydro and Petrobras that, although partially privatized, still seem to
operate in some ways that reflect interests of their national governments. (…)
the term “Big Five” refers to the Exxon Mobil, BP, Chevron, Royal Dutch
Shell and ConocoPhillips. Together with Total and ENI, these companies are
commonly referred to as the “supermajors.”
We decided to exclude the factor oil price from this study. Oil price is
certainly relevant for the oil&gas market and strategic alliances, but it is too
complex for being analysed in this paper.
The question we ask ourselves in this paper is how strategic alliances in the
oil&gas industry are related to competitive strategies and competitive forces.
Two questions derive immediately from this problem.
• What are the relations between the competitive forces of the market
and the competitive strategies of the company? We will delimitate the
question to the competitive strategies of the IOC.
• What are the relations between the competitive strategies of the IOC
and strategic alliances?
Our study case will be the alliance between Eni and Statoilhydro in the
Goliat oilfield in the Barents Sea. First, we will analyse alliance in a theoretic
way in chapter 2. In chapter 3 we will present the oil&gas industry, study the
elements already mentioned here (competitive forces, competitive strategies,
strategic alliances and the parts in it), and the Goliat case. We will then
concentrate on Eni’s strategy and on the relation between competitive
strategy and strategic alliance for Eni.
In chapter 2, we will start analysing strategic alliances and will continue
analysing the competitive forces within the oil&gas industry. We will
consider the main weaknesses and strengths of IOCs, and will individuate
their competitive strategies.
After this, we will search for the reasons that bring from competitive
strategies to strategic alliance. These reasons could be other competitive
12
forces in the market or competition strategies of other companies, possibly of
those companies, which are the other part of the alliance.
Our analysis of the alliance will therefore not be symmetric, because we will
consider only the IOC’s perspective.
Our study case is an alliance between an IOC (Eni) and a NOC
(Statoilhydro). Our theory will be based on the same pattern. We will
concentrate on the competitive strategy of an IOC, considering NOC’s
competitive strategy as an external factor that could maybe have an influence
on IOC’s decision of realising its competitive strategy though the alliance.
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2. Theory
2.1 Theory on strategic alliances
What is a strategic alliance? Quoting Holmberg and Cummings (Holmberg
and Cummings, “Building Successful Strategic Alliances, Strategic Process
and Analytical Tool for Selecting Partner Industries and Firms”, Elsevier,
Long Range Planning 42 (2009) 164e193) strategic alliances are
“Cooperative arrangements between two or more firms to improve their
competitive position and performance by sharing resources”.
Thomson, Strickland and Gamble (Thomson, Strickland III, Gamble,
“Crafting and executing strategy” McGraw-Hill, 16th edition, page 163) list
five characteristics that make cooperation strategic
“ 1.  It is critical to the company’s achievement of an important objective
2. It helps build, sustain or enhance a core competence or competitive
advantage
3. It helps block a competitive threat
4. It helps open up important market opportunities
5. It mitigates a significant risk to a company’s business”
1. It is critical to the company’s achievement of an important objective
The alliance is the realisation of a competitive strategy that has an already
specified objective. Since the scope of competitive strategy is gaining (or
keeping) competitive advantage, we can also say that firms make alliances
for reaching competitive advantage, and that they make them when there are
no other valid alternatives, as when critical resources are not available within
the company, and it is therefore necessary to get them from outside, or when
there are externalities in the market that make cooperation the only feasible
alternative.
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2. It helps build, sustain or enhance a core competence or competitive
advantage
The closer the alliance is to the core competence of the firm, the more
strategically important this alliance is. Core competence is defined as the
complex of the unique and valuable properties that give the company
competitive advantage (Haugland, “Samarbeid, alliancer og nettverk”
Universitetsforlaget, 2004, page 27). So, since strategic alliances are a
realisation of competitive strategies, their scope is strongly connected to the
core competence and to the goal of gaining competitive advantage.
3. It helps block a competitive threat
Blocking competitive threat is a competitive strategy as well. It answers to a
threat in the market. We emphasise again that strategic alliances are a
competitive strategy tool. An example of such an alliance is cooperating with
strong competitors, in order to turn them into allied rather than a threat.
4. It helps open up important market opportunities
Opening market opportunities is another competitive strategy. An example of
such an alliance is the cooperation with a strong distributor that can help the
company placing its products in new markets.
5. It mitigates a significant risk to a company’s business
A significant risk can be for example scarcity of resources in the market.
Resources can be raw materials, know-how or manpower.
An example of how an alliance can mitigate a significant risk is the
cooperation with a supplier in a market where there is scarcity of resources
and a consequent strong bargaining power of suppliers. Of course the firm
must be able to offer add value to the supplier in order to motivate the
supplier to collaborate.
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In addition, we can add that alliances
6. Have the advantage of being flexible, in opposition to merge, fusion or
purchase
Strategic alliances involve partially also organisational strategy, but do not
bring major changes, in opposition to fusions and purchase.
As we already mentioned, firms make alliances when they lack resources
internally, and when these resources are available outside. The next question
will be about how to get to them. There are usually three ways, i.e.
purchasing services, purchasing companies, and strategic alliances
Strategic alliances are the most flexible alternative, and it is usually chosen
in very instable and complex contexts, were it is necessary to adapt quickly
to the continuous market modifications and to have specific know-how in
different areas.
Purchasing a supplier or a customer or a competitor involves all the risks and
costs connected with the fusion of separated entities into one, and it does not
leave space to change of strategy.
Buying services is another alternative that guarantees flexibility, and that can
provide the needed resources on the short term and for a specific case. In the
oil&gas industry, IOCs often purchase services from Independent Oil
Companies.
As a long time commitment, an alliance allows building networks that can
bring to new business and opportunities in the future, and to exchanging
development of competence. Both parts will be able to continue activities
independently.
It is in addition possible to involve more parts into the alliance, and to
undertake more alliances with different partners.
Respect to integration, strategic alliances have therefore the clear advantage
of being flexible.
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7. Imply risk
The main risk is connected with what mentioned at point 2, “It helps build,
sustain or enhance a core competence or competitive advantage”. Haugland
(2004) warns about the danger of being subtracted core competence during
an alliance. It is a big challenge typical of any occasion when the core
competence, i.e. the most valuable properties of a firm, are exposed to
another company. Being able to cooperating without being stolen important
competence is a crucial skill.
8. Can have different form, structure and different positions within the value
chain.
Partnerships can have different forms. The idea of form in an alliance refers
to the levels of connection between the parts. Connections can be less or
more tight. They can be active just out in the market or internally to the
organisation.
If the collaboration involves organisation issues, connections are very tight.
Fig 2, taken from Nygaard (2007) describes the different forms of
collaboration in this market versus internal organisation perspective,
characterising the first with weak connections and low interdependence, and
the second with strong connections and interdependence.
Haugland (2004) considers this bipolar scheme as not applicable to long and
complex alliances as a whole, but as correctly describing single moments of
the cooperation. While elaborating solutions, parts will be quite independent
when a market-oriented option is chosen. In cases when actions affecting
organisation are the issue, parts have less decision freedom.
Strategic alliances can have different structures. They can involve parts at the
same level in the supply chain or at different levels. In the first case the
collaboration is between competitors or potential competitors. Operators
occupying a similar position in the supply chain join into a horizontal
alliance.
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In the second case the partnership is undertaken between supplier and
customer in a vertical structure.
The structure of an alliance, especially of a horizontal one, can vary also
according to the number of members included. When more than ten
companies are involved, we prefer to talk about chain or network rather then
of partnership or alliance. (Haugland, 2004) Examples of such agreements
are networks in the civil aviation industry as Sky Team or Star Alliance.
Strategic alliances also have different positions within the value chain and
cover different functions. Nygaard (2007) reports Urban and Vendemini’s
list of functions where alliances are possible, regrouped in five value chain
phases
Fig 3, Value Chain from Nygaard (2007), page 18.
9. Allow getting resources the firm does not have internally
The fact that an alliance allows getting resources the firm does not have
internally can at this point seem obvious. Later we will see that getting
resources from outside is not just a case of filling the gap in the moment
when it is evident that there is a critical lack of resources, but also a question
of mindset behind the strategy.
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10. Can be defensive or offensive
Strategic alliances can be defensive or offensive strategy. It means that firms
can choose to strengthen market values that already exist, rather than creating
new ones. Newman and Chaharbaghi (1996) introduce this defensive-
offensive bipolar model, and base on it observations about how strategic
alliances can be source of competitive advantage.
A defensive strategy will usually consist in protecting the market. An
offensive one aims to the exact opposite, i.e. to changing the market through
different knowledge and new products.
11. Last but not least, a good strategic alliance is part of the corporate
strategy.
Green and Keogh (2000) mention commitment and example from senior
management as one of the necessary factors for the success of a strategic
alliance. Management’s support is essential (page 252) “to do whatever is
necessary to ensure its success”
Holmberg and Cummings (2009) consider as vital (page 171) “to clarify how
a prospective alliance might create value for a firm, and to identify specific
links to corporate objectives (…) Firms facing dynamic external and/or
internal environments have an even greater need to align their corporate and
strategic alliance objectives systematically.”
Strategic alliances as an implementation of Competitive
Strategy
Strategic alliances are one way to realise competitive strategies. Thomson,
Strickland and Gamble indicate Strategic Alliances as part of competitive
strategies in turbulent, high-velocity markets (Thomson, Strickland and
Gamble, “Crafting and executing strategy” McGraw-Hill, 16th edition, page
244) say that firms rely on strategic alliance in this kind of market for
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building their competitive position “not just by strengthening their own
internal resource base but also by partnering with those suppliers making
state-of-the-art parts and components and by collaborating closely with both
the developers of related technologies (…) An outsourcing strategy also
allows a company the flexibility to replace suppliers that fall behind on
technology or product features or that cease to be competitive on price”.
The circumstance of a market in continuous modification, where values
change fast and competition is based on the capacity of adapting in a
particularly quickly, suggests competitive strategies based on speed of
change and innovation.
Strategic alliances are a good strategic tool in such markets because it helps
innovation bringing new ideas and knowledge from outside into the
company. Through an alliance, a firm can get immediate contact with the
resources of a competitor. Another reason of the efficiency of strategic
alliances in this kind of market is its flexibility. When market values and
conditions change, alliances can be discussed and reconsidered, differently
from a fusion.
2.2 Theory on competitive advantage and competitive
strategy in oil companies
In literature, there are four main theories about competitive advantage. None
of them exclude the others. Each single real case is probably a different
combination of all of them. The four theories focus each on one factor, which
would give competitive advantage.
(1) (Nature) resources control
(2) Competence specialisation
(3) Unique combination of resources and competence
(4) Leading skills of the management
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Theory (1) is very relevant for oil&gas industry. Resources are a crucial
factor for gaining advantage over competitors.
Theories (2) and (3) are relevant for many operators. To service companies,
high specialisation is a stronger source of advantage than a combination of
resources and competence.
Theory (2) is probably preferable for smaller dimensions operators, which
are trying to differentiate themselves, not being able to compete on a mix of
resources and competences.
Instead, IOCs gain advantage though competitive technology and large
amount of resources (theory 3).
Theory (4), emphasising the management’s role as motivating, is probably
applicable to single moments of the business, but we do not consider it as
relevant for this industry.
We definitely consider theory (1) as the one describing competitive
advantage for IOCs. In the oil&gas market, the main concern for IOCs is
replacing their reserves. In order to replace reserves, IOCs must be able to
collaborate with governments, and maintain a high technological level being
in this way able to offer top-quality solutions both in terms of environment,
local society and costs to NOCs, which are obligatory partners for accessing
reserves.
The main competitive forces in the oil&gas market that affect IOCs are the
lack of reserves and the relative bargaining power of suppliers, and fast-pace
technological development.
These forces result in competitive strategies such as increasing the number of
suppliers (to reduce dependence on single ones and their bargaining power),
and gaining or keeping learning and knowledge leadership.
These strategies are then influenced by other competitive forces and
strategies, and can arrive to a compromise with government in order to
overcome strong regulations, or to meet the expectations of stronger
competence that the local NOC has toward the IOC. The result of these
21
complementarities brings to strategic alliances. Strategic alliances are an
implementation of competitive strategies.
Fig 4, Strategic Alliances as Competition Strategy Implementation
The oil&gas industry is characterised by high investments and high
technology. It is
• A very complex market, influenced by strong swing in oil price,
different kind of producers, heavy environmental-related issues, a
large variety of products, and an extremely sophisticated production
chain, which starts from very demanding phases of exploration.
• A turbulent market, depending on the availability of the raw material,
which is often controlled by Countries that manage them in a political
way, causing uncertainty in the supply of the main resource.
Technology develops at a fast pace, leaving behind those companies
that are not keeping themselves updated.
Oil&gas industry is therefore characterised by high rivalry. Rivalry is one of
the forces active in a market, and it is influenced by a combination of four
other main forces, as illustrated in fig 5.
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Fig 5, Porter’s Forces Analysis
We will analyse the forces within the oil&gas market, basing ourselves on
Porter’s Forces Analysis model as studied in “Strategic analysis of Statoil’s
international competitiveness” of Ellefsen Aubert and Kjølmoen Frigstad’s,
masterthesis from 2007.
Ellefsen Aubert and Kjølmoen Frigstad conducted an analysis of Porter’s
model for the O&G industry, coming to the following conclusions about
relevant forces within the market.
Threats of substitute products and bargaining power of customers are very
low. It is known from energy debate that there are few alternative products to
oil and gas.
Nuclear presents many problems at level of safety and waste disposal.
Hydrogen and solar energy have not been developed enough for commercial
purposes yet. Hydrogen requires still much energy for production itself.
Differently from oil, nor hydrogen or solar energy can be stored or
transported. There will therefore be no fall in the demand for oil in the next
future, if not because of a fall in industrial production.
We can conclude that there is no threat coming from substitute products.
Also threats coming from bargaining power of customers are low. In the
oil&gas market, customers are too many to be able to bargain. It is enough to
consider one main product of this market. Gasoline is sold through a
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capillary network of stations. Each of us purchases gasoline singularly at the
gasoline station. The producer also owns the distribution network. It means
that each producer sells to million of customers that have to connection
between themselves as customers of that product. Each customer buys only a
minimal part of the total market. Since there is no coordination between
customers for choosing on brand of gasoline or the other, prices of all brands
are similar also in their swings, and it is not possible to find an alternative
product to gasoline, customers have no bargaining power.
An important factor, which is getting stronger, is the threats of new entrants.
The traditional operators in the oil&gas market are International Oil
Companies (IOC). In the past, a new entrant would have been another IOC,
which made the possibility of potential new competitors very low, because of
the high capital and complexity of resources and competence needed in this
market.
In more recent times, two new kinds of operator have grown up to the level
of being able to threaten IOCs as competitors.
National Oil Companies (NOC) were originally established by reserve
holding Countries who chose to develop a local oil industry, rather than just
sell the raw material to foreign operators. NOC have now reached
dimensions and know-how levels, which allow them to have international
ambitions at the same level as IOCs.
Another category of oil operator has become a potential competitor for IOCs.
Independent Oil Service Companies, or simply “Independents” were
originally meant to provide just specific services to IOCs. They have now
developed good vertical connections and collaborative skills with those
major companies, which buy their services.
Threat of new entrants is therefore high in oil&gas industry.
The strongest factor is probably the bargaining power of suppliers. Suppliers
in oil&gas industry are reserve holding Countries. They can decide how
much oil they want to sell, and to what price. Their bargaining power is of
course depending on oil price as well. When price is high, this power gets
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stronger. Oil&gas suppliers have always tried to keep oil price at an optimal
level for them, controlling production and with that the quantity of oil on the
market. Not all supplier Countries have joined OPEC, and oil price still
fluctuates depending on many factors. Reserve holding States can also put
strong requirements about environmental impact and involving of the local
industry.
Another major factor affecting supply are political issues. Countries can
suddenly decide to nationalise their reserves, as Venezuela, cutting all
operators out of their local market and denying them access to local
resources. Instability is a feature of the oil&gas market.
Competitive strategy in oil&gas will be then focused on reducing or avoiding
bargaining power of suppliers and cutting potential new entrants out of the
market.
Ellefsen Aubert and Kjølmoen Frigstad’s conclusions show a strong
competitive rivalry in the industry, mainly due to strong bargaining power of
suppliers and to threats of new entrants.
Fig 6, Porter’s Forces Analysis – Oil&Gas case
The first factor is IOC’s main concern. Expressed in other words, it is
replacing oil reserves. IOC’s competitive strategies will focus on reaching
resources and on decreasing dependence from single reserve holding
Countries.
The second factor is usually NOC’s main problem, especially of those ones
that own very high amounts of reserves. NOCs’ relative strategy consists in
making use of political barriers (to be alone in exploiting their reserves) and
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to developing skilled personnel (in order not to have need for IOC’s
competence).
Since our study has an IOC-based perspective, we will focus on bargaining
power of supplier. For what concerns IOCs, the strongest force in the
oil&gas market is reserve replacement. As a consequence, IOCs try to reach
as many sources of commercial varieties of oil as possible. There where
resources are owned and controlled by Government, collaborating with the
local NOC is often a condition sine-qua-non.
Making an alliance with the local NOC is a realisation of IOCs’
competitive strategy of containing bargaining power of suppliers. Having
more suppliers means delimitate dependence from single ones, and therefore
also their bargaining power. It is also a choice influenced by market
conditions as protectionism or strong access regulations. If oil reserves were
not controlled by governments that impose sharing operations and revenues
with local NOCs, IOCs would probably make a less frequent use of alliances.
Referring to our model at fig 4, bargaining power of suppliers is the
competitive force, getting more suppliers is the competitive strategy, and
alliance is an implementation of the strategy. At this point, we will have to
enter the partner’s competitive strategy “protectionism / strong regulation”,
which, from an IOC’s perspective, is another forces present in the market.
IOC’s competitive strategy (reserve replacement), combined with this market
force, will result in an alliance. It is of course necessary that this alliance will
also fit NOC’s strategy. This could happen if the NOC could benefit of
IOC’s competences. See analytic model at chapter 2.3.
We have already mentioned the particular connection between turbulent
markets and the use of strategic alliances. Referring to our model at fig 4,
turbulence is the competitive force, and we will see that strategic alliance
is an implementation of the relative strategy.
This competitive strategy in between is, according to Newman and
Chaharbaghi (1996), sustaining leadership in learning and knowledge.
Turbulence in oil&gas is also caused by fast-pace technology evolution, in
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addition to geopolitical issues. In these cases, it is more frequent for IOCs to
search for collaboration with Independent Oil Companies, which have
specific skills and knowledge. But there are also NOCs that have special
know-how and that can be an interesting partner for this kind of alliances.
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2.3 Analytic model
Fig 7, relations between competition forces, competition strategy and strategic
alliances
The analytic model illustrates the steps from the individuation of competitive
forces to the implementation of the strategic alliance.
• Competitive strategies are elaborated on the basis of the competitive
forces in the market.
• There are other market forces then, which influence the realisation of
competitive strategies.
• The combination of competitive strategies and market forces can
suggest the implementation of the strategy through a strategic
alliance.
• For being possible, a strategic alliance needs a complementary
partner’s competitive strategy.
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3. Analysis
3.1 Presentation of the industry
The oil&gas industry in characterised by high capital, big investment, high
technology and environmental impact. It is in addition a fast-moving market,
where new technology and product are constantly developed.
3.1.1 INTERNATIONAL OIL COMPANIES
International Oil Companies are the largest operators in the market. They
have been the first to develop competence, and are still very strong at
managing big fields. They operate best on large scale. They have both
technology and financial possibilities for managing big risks projects and
operate in a quite high profitable way. Monetisation is one the main parts of
their strategies.
Their weak point lies now in technology innovation and reserve replacement.
According to Jaffe and Soligo, IOCs have “invested less in exploration and
increased operating cash flow on share repurchases and dividends. Their
production has declined since 1990s”, while 80% of reserves are held by
NOCs.
Not investing in R&D, IOCs are losing the main competitive advantage they
have always had on NOCs and the easiest way to gain access to their
reserves. Less access to reserves, together with lack of R&D, means that
IOCs are able to replace their reserves in an efficient way at the moment.
This means that reserve replacement and R&D are a concern of the entire
market.
3.1.2 NATIONAL OIL COMPANIES
National Oil Companies are State owned companies. They have privileged
access to National reserves and, differently from IOCs, do not have
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monetisation as main goal of their business. A NOC operates in order to
bring benefit to the Country, giving support for local economy and often
protecting the environment of the territory.
NOCs have traditionally had a lower technology level than IOCs, and used to
giving them access to national resources in order to make use of higher
competence and, through the same collaboration, building up skilled
personnel.
Many NOCs have been evolving from being entities at exclusive service of
governments, to partially private companies. It is the case of Statoilhydro. It
is interesting to notice that Eni and Total were originally NOCs.
IOCs and NOCs are the main operators of the market. The second ones hold
most reserves, while the first have knowledge and large-scale leadership.
NOCs are stronger in terms of reserves, while IOCs are stronger at
competence level.
3.1.3 STRATEGIC ALLIANCES IN THE OIL&GAS
INDUSTRY
The competitive force affecting IOCs is the bargaining power of supplier.
Suppliers have a stronger bargaining power when they are few and when
there is scarcity of the resource they own.
On IOCs’ side, the competitive strategy consists in enlarging the number of
their suppliers, reducing in this way dependence from single ones. In
practise, this strategy is implemented
• Expanding operations to new/more reserve holding Countries
• Investing on innovation
• Investing on exploration of new areas
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Expanding operations to new/more reserve holding Countries requires
the permission of Countries’ governments. We have already illustrated that
States protect their reserves, their local industry and environment, and put
many conditions for operating on their territory. Strong regulations can be for
example imposing IOCs to establish local offices, creating work places for
local inhabitants, to use local sub-suppliers, providing support for local
economy, and to respect a severe environmental legislation.
In some cases, reserves holding Countries do not have competence and
financial resources enough to manage oil production by themselves.  In these
cases, IOCs have usually easy access to reserves. Some Countries have top-
skilled National Oil Companies, or even have an entirely developed oil
industry. It is less likely to happen that IOC can operate in these Countries,
except if they accept to collaborate with the local oil industry. In other
words, strategic alliances with NOCs or with another representative of local
oil industry are often the only way IOCs can implement their competitive
strategy “Expanding operations to new/more reserve holding Countries”.
Investing in innovation is essential in a high-velocity market based on high
technology. In addition, innovation is a value also NOCs are interested in,
and that therefore helps IOCs making strategic alliances with them. In the
same time, it is easier and faster to innovate working together with others,
rather than working alone. So, also the strategy of innovation needs strategic
alliances for being realised.
Investing in exploration of new areas is a combination of expansion of
reserves and investing in innovation, and, as a consequence, it also goes
through strategic alliances. An example of exploration of new areas is the
study case Goliat.
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FAST-MOVING MARKETS AND STRATEGIC ALLIANCES
At this point we need to explain another characteristics of the oil&gas
market, which IOCs consider when planning strategy.
The oil&gas market is a fast-moving market. It means that market values
change continuously. Also this force requires an appropriate strategy. When
things change so fast, it is clear that waiting for the first-mover to show us
what to do is a losing strategy. In a market where things change all the time,
and where there is always the risk to take decisions too late, the right
competitive strategy is being the first-mover, bringing new values (new
technology, new products, new policies) into the market.
Newman and Chaharbaghi describe the relation between turbulent markets
and strategic alliances and explain that, in order to gain competitive
advantage, these must be part of an offensive competitive strategy.
Strategic alliances can be the realisation of a defensive or offensive
competitive strategy.  Offensive strategies aim to the creation of new markets
values. We agree with Newman and Chaharbaghi that offensive strategy is
necessary in a fast-moving market.
“The real competitive strategy is about doing new things rather than
focusing on optimising the way things are currently done”
Strategic alliances should be part of an offensive strategy, because only in
this way they can bring to competitive advantage. Newman and Chaharbaghi
warn against other uses of alliance in fast-moving markets.
“Strategic alliances are often used as the next step for survival. That is, if the
organisation cannot compete effectively then it has to become partner
dependent. Although this approach may prolong life, it will not lead to
sustainable competitive advantage”(Newman and Chaharbaghi, “strategic
alliances in fast-moving markets” copyright 1996, published by Elsevier
Science Ltd, page 850).
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They express scepticism about optimisation mindset in fast-moving markets,
because competitive advantage can be sustained only through a continuous
destabilisation of market values in such markets. They consider learning and
knowledge leadership as the scope companies make strategic alliances for. In
other words, the parts of the alliance would be interested in learning from
each other, avoiding the two risks of remaining isolated in a hopeless effort
of internal optimisation, and of being left behind in a continuously changing
market.
In practise, IOCs must constantly develop
• Supplier network, expanding operations to new Countries
• New technology, for more efficient exploration and operations,
including environmental-oriented technology.
Developing new technology has a double purpose. The first one is
maximising resources and making use of not conventional oil reserves.
Developing new technology to maximise resources exploitation is a way of
enlarging available resources. Today, most oil fields are exploited only to a
minimal part. New pumping methods could multiply resources just starting
from already available resources. This is called “Enhanced oil recovery”
(Shell 2006). It will give the possibility of getting more out of already
available reserves. It is a short-term strategy though (Jaffe), because it is not
sufficient for covering reserve replacement.
New technologies could give the opportunity to make use of not
conventional oil reserves. Today the main raw materials in the market are the
two varieties Brent and WTI, quite liquid and with a low sulphurous content.
Modern production technologies are focused on these two kinds of oil, but
the planet is still full of thicker and more sulphurous varieties of oil. Being
able to commercialise them would mean not anymore being depending on
Brent and WTI resources, enlarging operations to those new materials.
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The second purpose for innovation is related to strategic alliances. Firms that
are competence leaders can offer their know-how to reserve holding
Countries in exchange to access to national reserves, of course through
collaboration. Competence is not only a competitive advantage in itself, but
it also makes of an IOC a potential partner for NOCs. In other words,
innovation gives competence leadership, and competence is the added value
NOCs expects from IOCs.
Practising a strategy of constant destabilisation of market values is the
competitive strategy that allows companies to gain competitive advantage in
a fast-moving market like oil&gas.
We must add that another reason of turbulence of the market are the
geopolical events that can affect raw material supply dramatically. Again,
optimising relations only with some suppliers can be the end of resource
availability, in case of political changes in the Countries of those suppliers.
In order to reduce the risks coming from political instability, it is necessary
not to concentrate on few suppliers, but getting as many as possible.
We have already explained Newman and Chaharbaghi’s theory about
Strategic alliances in fast-moving markets. By themselves, companies cannot
generate competence enough for staying competitive. Joining other
companies is the only way to stay updated. Companies that follow a strategy
of internal resources optimisation are destined to lose competitive advantage
both at level of competence and of access to resources.
Strategic alliances are therefore necessary to oil companies for gaining
competitive advantage, and the reason for this is the turbulence of the
market. In such a market, optimisation is a losing strategy because it is too
slow. When trends change fast, the only way to stay updated is being close to
competitors, sharing and exchanging competence with them, and keeping a
supplier network as various as possible.
Also Thomson, Strickland and Gamble define strategic alliances as
advantageous in high-velocity markets, as we said in 2.1. They also confirm
our theory, i.e. that strategic alliances are an implementation of strategies for
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competitive advantage for IOCs in the specific market of oil&gas. At page
165, they indicate the reasons company racing for global market leadership
needs alliances to.
“Get into critical Country markets quickly and accelerate the process of
building a potent global market presence”, which we previously defined as
“developing supplier network”, but that also refer to the importance of a
large distribution network. We have explained its importance in chapter 2.2
about the bargaining power of customers.
“Access valuable skills and competencies that are concentrated in particular
geographic locations”, which corresponds to “innovation” or “technology
development”
The competitive advantages IOCs want to gain are leaderships of resources
and innovation. Strategic alliances are the implementation of the relative
competitive strategies.
• Strategic alliances can be the only way to get access to resources.
• For what concerns innovation, strategic alliances are the only
possibility that allows the firms to innovate fast enough to keep the
pace with the market.
RELATIONAL SKILLS AND STRATEGIC ALLIANCE
In order to get concessions for exploring and operating, an oil company shall
bring added value to the reserve holding Country.
Beside concession payments and part of the revenues, these Countries are
interested in reinforcing local economy and keeping environmental impact
low.
Oil industry has always represented a harm for the environment, and the
presence of an oil platform, of an oil tank or of an oil pipe carry the risk of
damages on the environment, both on a constant basis and in case of
accidents. It is important that oil companies offer solutions that minimize
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environmental impact. Ignoring it and choosing solutions economically
convenient on the short term will damage the company, because it will lose
chances to get new concessions from those Countries, which see a value in
protecting environment.
Offering environmentally friendly solutions does also mean that the company
shall not just apply its own technology, but also keep an open dialogue with
local communities. An environmentally friendly policy cannot be such
without listening to those who know the place and live in it. Companies shall
show that inputs from the Country and the local communities are considered.
Companies are supposed to bring solutions that respect the indications of
local communities. If an area is indicated as especially sensitive, the
company should propose new solutions, which guarantee the preservation of
the area.
Being able to offer environmentally friendly solutions is a part of an oil
company’s strategy for staying competitive, because it enhance the
possibilities of making alliances with more suppliers, reducing the
dependence from single ones, and therefore their bargaining power.
Governments are likely to choose operators, which show tendency to involve
local service companies, because this means providing support and
development for the national economy.
Respecting regulations, keeping an open dialogue with local communities
and involving local economy are all collaborative skills, and are necessary to
those firms that need to collaborate with others, like IOCs need to make
alliances with local NOCs.
In the last decades, NOCs have been reluctant to open their reserves to IOCs.
Nationalism and Protectionism have been a common policy, which have
often brought to swing in oil supply on the world market. IOCs approach and
behaviour was in part responsible for this reaction of producing Countries.
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IOCs’ strategy should therefore include attention for the needs of the
Countries they are interested to operate in. IOC’s (Jaffe). Nationalism and
Protectionism are not the only obstacles to cooperation between IOCs and
NOCs. Other factors, which triggered NOC’s interest for opening to IOCs,
have declined. The expertise of IOCs is strongest when working with big oil
fields, which there has been scarcity of in the last decades. Newly discovered
fields are smaller then old ones, and when fields are smaller, the NOC can
find more convenient to make use of service companies, rather than opening
to IOCs.
It is crucial that IOCs learn to collaborate with producer Countries adding
real value to their operations (Shell 2006). We have seen that there are many
factors that could decrease IOC’s chances to make alliances with NOC. IOCs
shall develop relational skills as part of its competitive strategy.
3.1.4 IOCs’ and NOCs’ STRATEGIES
Analysing the market, we see that reducing bargaining power of suppliers is
mainly a concern of IOCs, which barely hold 10% of world reserves, while
NOCs, strong of their national reserves, are more concerned about keeping
competitors away from them.
When analysing strategic alliances, we must analyse which strategies bring
partners together, and who the partners are. We have already concluded that
IOCs have certain weaknesses and strengths, while other operators have
other ones, and we understand that it is complementary needs and goals
bringing partners together.
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We refer to www.npd.no, the website of the Norwegian Petroleum
Directorate, and more precisely to the production figures’ page
http://www.npd.no/engelsk/cwi/pbl/en/index.htm.
There are about 550 production licences on the Norwegian continental shelf.
We considered licences from 200 to 299. We sorted the here-included 57
active licences in 7 groups, according to the type of owner(s).
• one IOC
• one NOC, in this case Statoil
• one or more Independent Oil Companies
• a partnership of IOC and NOC
• a partnership of IOC and Independent Oil Company
• a partnership of NOC and Independent Oil Company
• a partnership of IOC, NOC and Independent Oil Company
Data are shown in Appendix 1.
As a result, we can see that the majority of licences sees a combination of
more companies. In 51 cases the licence is object of an alliance, while 100%
ownership is limited to only 6 cases.
We can notice that only in one case an IOC has 100% ownership, while
Statoil counts 5.
Among alliances, we can see that there are no cases of IOCs operating
together, while Independents join in 6 cases. We have chosen not to consider
licences 248, 248b and 277, where only Statoilhydro and Petoro are present,
as NOC-NOC cooperation.
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LICENCE OWNER(S) QUANTITY OF LICENCES
IOC 1
NOC 5
6
Independent Oil Companies 6
IOC and NOC 14
IOC and Independent Oil Company 6
NOC and Independent Oil Company 12
IOC, NOC and Independent Oil Company 13
51
ACTIVE LICENCES BETWEEN NR 200 AND 299 57
Table 1, Ownership types for Norwegian Continental Shelf licences 200-299
Elaboration from Norwegian Petroleum Directorate data www.ndp.no
IOCs need resources. They are therefore necessarily interested in
collaborating with NOCs, which own resources. The reason why also NOCs
are willing to collaborate with IOCs is that such alliances are a solution for
NOCs’ competition strategy as well, which we will not analyse further here.
Collaboration with Independent Oil Companies actually consists in
outsourcing. Quoting Jaffe and Soligo (Jaffe and Soligo, “The International
Oil Companies”, The James A.Baker III Institute for Public Policy, Rice
University, November 2007, page 36) “IOCs have become more like general
contractors, coordinating the operation of a number of suppliers who
themselves are the ones who undertake seismic work, analyse data, provide
drilling rigs and crews and a host of oil field services. The larger IOCs also
serve the function of bankers…”
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3.2 Presentation of ENI and Statoilhydro
3.2.1 ENI
Eni has been one off the so-called “Seven Sister” that used to dominate oil
market in the past. These are today BP, Chevron, Conocophillips,
Exxonmobil, Royal Dutch Shell, Total and Eni.
According to website www.eni.it, Eni is present in 70 Countries, has about
79,000 employees, and “operates in the oil and gas, electricity generation
and sale, petrochemicals, oilfield services construction and engineering
industries.”
In  1929 AGIP (Azienda Generale Italiana Petroli – Italian General Oil
Company) was established. In 1956 the Italian Government incorporated it in
a new company, still of State ownership. This company was ENI (Ente
Nazionale Idrocarburi).
During the 50’ies, Eni launched a new way in approaching reserves holding
Countries, which involved them in the management of their oil resources (see
Eni’s website at page http://www.eni.it/en_IT/company/history/the-steps/the-
50s-60s/the-50s-60s.shtml), in contrast with the common policy in use at that
time.
Eni has been privatised during the 90’ies and it is now a stock company. The
Italian Government still has the golden share of Eni.
Compared to the Big Five (BP, Chevron, Conocophillips, Exxonmobil,
Royal Dutch Shell), Eni has a few specific characteristics.
First of all, it was actually started as a National Oil Company, and kept
this status until about fifteen years ago.
Second, it has always had scarcity of reserves compared to the dimensions
of its operations, being Italy very poor of raw materials.
Third, Eni has always had an inclusive way of approaching reserves
holding Countries, launching the partnership model in the relations between
supermajors and producing Countries. The intuition of this innovative way of
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making business in the oil industry is attributed to Enrico Mattei, first
president and then CEO of Eni.
“Eni wouldn’t exist without the stable alliance developed in forty years of
steady work in Egypt and with Egypt. The same applies in Angola, Congo
and, above all, Nigeria. Mattei stood for extremely modern entrepreneurial
thinking and action: he understood that an industry with the structural
characteristics that I mentioned above (.i.e, “The oil industry is unique in
that a key component of its production process is bound to run out sooner or
later, its resources being limited rather than unlimited”), needed stable and
long- lasting relationships with producing countries in order to operate. Eni
is perhaps the most important company currently operating in Nigeria
because it managed to establish stable relationships with that country,
irrespective of its political regime.”
From “Eni’s Way, Monografie”, at http:// www.eni.it/ attachments/ media/
magazine/ monographies/ secolo_mattei.pdf
In Norway Eni is present as Eni Norge AS, and has 52 production licences,
of which 15 as operator. To make a comparison, Conocophillips has 39
licences of which 14 as operator, and Total 78, 15 as operator.
The source is http://www.npd.no/engelsk/cwi/pbl/en/comp/all.htm, the
Norwegian Petroleum Directorate. Data are shown in Appendix.
Of these 52 licences, we notice the presence of
• Statoilhydro in 46
• Total in 20, where Statoilhydro is always present
• Exxonmobile in 14, where Statoilhydro is always present
• Conocophillips in 8, where Statoilhydro is present in 6 cases
• Several Independents
We can notice that Eni’s trend (for what concerns the Norwegian Continental
Shelf) is collaborating with Statoilhydro.
Collaborating with Statoilhydro means gaining access to reserves.
Collaborating with IOCs could mean sharing risk, but since Statoilhydro is
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always present also when another IOC is in the group, we understand that the
purpose is the alliance with Statoilhydro for the access to reserves.
There are only 2 cases of alliance with an IOC in absence of Statoilhydro.
3.2.2 STATOILHYDRO
Statoilhydro is the result of the merge between Statoil and Hydro, which took
place in 2007.
 “Statoil and Hydro have been the most important players in the Norwegian
oil industry, with proud traditions of expertise and innovation stretching
back to the early 1970s. (…)Hydro's history began in 1905 (…) At the time of
the merger, Hydro was operator for 13 oil and gas fields on the Norwegian
continental shelf. (…) In 1972, the Norwegian State Oil Company, Statoil,
was formed, and two years later the Statfjord field was discovered in the
North Sea. In 1979, the Statfjord field commenced production, and in 1981
Statoil was the first Norwegian company to be given operator responsibility
for a field, at Gullfaks in the North Sea. At the time of the merger, Statoil was
operator for 39 oil and gas fields on the Norwegian continental shelf.”
(Quoting from http://www.statoilhydro.com/en/ aboutstatoilhydro/
history/pages/default3.aspx)
Statoilhydro is present in 40 Countries, counts about 29,500 employees, and
is a leader in operation involving deepwater technology.
Statoil was gradually privatised between 2001 and 2004. Today the
Norwegian State is the main owner of Statoilhydro owning 67% of the
shares.
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Statoil and Hydro have been crucial for developing industry in Norway. If
Hydro already existed when the first oil was found, Statoil was established
with the specific purpose of developing an industry around the new resource,
aiming to reaching real expertise and possibility of future business and
activities independent from Norwegian oil resources. Both Statoil and Hydro
have expanded their operations abroad, and reached top-level competence.
When merging, the two companies have put together their business abroad,
providing the new Statoilhydro with a larger network, with the clear goal of
expanding abroad, not being an exclusively nationally oriented NOC, but a
rising NOC, with many traits in common with the still larger IOCs.
Statoilhydro has 228 production licences on the Norwegian Continental
Shelf, of which 172 as operator.
3.3 The cooperation project Goliat
The Oilfield Goliat is located in the Barents Sea. Goliat’s production licences
are number 229 and 229b. Eni is the operator with 65%. Statoilhydro is the
other licensee with 35%.
Quoting from http://www.eninorge.no/EniNo.nsf/page /A0CFFD6ED1D
B84E4C12574E60050E73C?OpenDocument&Lang=english
“Goliat can be the first oil development in the Norwegian sector of the
Barents Sea. Although the field is relatively small, development and
operation will have positive consequences for local and regional businesses
and employment”
Goliat is a particularly critical oilfield due to its location. It presents
environmental and technical challenges. The Barents Sea has deep seabed
and hard climatic conditions that can make operations difficult. It is in
addiction a fragile area; it is important also for local economy that the
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environment shall not be modified or polluted. There has always been a
strong debate about drilling in the Northern regions of Norway, and many
consider it dangerous for the environment and the local economy. This is the
reason of the great attention given to Goliat by media and institutions.
Goliat can be considered as a pioneer project. If it will give good production
results, and will be developed in a safe way for local society, economy and
environment, Goliat could be the example for starting a more intensive
exploitation of the Barents and Arctic area.
Statoilhydro and the Norwegian government have always protected the
interests of Norway through rigid environmental regulations, and providing
that oil-related activities brought work to local companies. In this
cooperation project, Eni has shown to share these concerns.
According to Eni’s and Norwegian press, decisions have been taken together
with local authorities, coming to solutions such as the establishment of the
headquarter in Hammerfest, which will create work places for the locals. In
addition, Eni collaborates with IRIS on environmental research. IRIS is the
International Research Institute of Stavanger. Eni is also working together
with Statoilhydro at many environmental-related projects.
Quoting from Eninorge’s website at http://www.eninorge.no/EniNo.nsf/page/
1893997362735D62C12574E600511DD3?OpenDocument&Lang=english
“By July 2008, 20 to 30 different projects have been identified and initiated
with an eye to make oil spill preparedness more efficient, especially during
operation in cold and dark conditions. (…) The last of these projects also
involves a local fisherman and is part of Eni Norge's strategy for building up
coastal oil spill preparedness for the long-term Goliat production period. In
this connection, Eni Norge wishes to enter into collaboration with local
fishermen in order to make use of unique local maritime know-how and the
resources that their vessels represent.”
Goliat is planned to start production in 2013. It has been decided that the
platform will be of the FPSO type (floating), and the contract for the
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construction has been awarded to Sevan Marine, which, as the spirit of the
collaboration with Statoilhydro would suggest, is a Norwegian company.
An interesting issue about Goliat is its electrification connection. Previously,
it had been agreed to use a cable from shore for electrification, in order to
reduce CO2 emission on the Norwegian Continental Shelf. In May 2009 Eni
communicated the decision of postponing electrification to a second phase
with strong reaction of environmental associations, but with the approval of
the Norwegian Government, which announced that Goliat will be receive
electricity from shore from 2017. (from Dagens Næringsliv, “Grønt lys for
Goliat” http://www.dn.no/energi/article1665882.ece, published 11.5.09).
Apparently, environmental issues lost priority.
The position the Norwegian government took shows that environmental
criteria are important, but that the priority is discovering new reserves.
Northern areas of Norway and Barents Sea have a big potential, and are
actually considered as a “locked” reserve that can invert the declining
tendency of production in the Norwegian Oil Industry. Representatives at the
Norwegian Parliament have recently reported that oil production in 2014 will
have decreased 50% since 2000. Helping companies exploring and producing
in new areas in order to find more oil would then be absolutely necessary.
(from Dagens Næringsliv, “Norges låste milliardformue“ http://www.dn.no/
energi/article1643388.ece, published 5.4.09)
Goliat is one of the few examples of an IOC carrying on exploration
activities in Norway.  Supermajors are discouraged from taking the risk of
exploring the Norwegian Continental Shelf by the fact that production is
actually impossible, or at least difficult, in the areas that have high potential,
because of regulations denying any industrial activity there. It is the case of
the coast in front of the Lofoten Islands and Tromsø, and more north in the
Barents Sea.
(Dagens Næringsliv, “Oljegigantene sitter på gjerdet“ http://www.dn.no/
forsiden/article1411238.ece, published 2.6.08)
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These areas are remaining unexplored, with big damage for the future of the
Norwegian oil industry, because IOCs judge exploration too risky in this
case. In addition to the risk typical of any exploration activity, these areas
have the additional risk of being probably impossible to operate in because of
very strict regulations.
3.4 The strategy of ENI
Eni’s official website states
“Eni's key objectives are to deliver industry-leading growth and attractive
shareholder returns over both the short and long-term”
The business strategy and targets for growth strategy is illustrated in the
following way.
Fig 8 Eni’s business strategies and targets for Growth Strategy, from www.eni.it
Available at http://www.eni.it/en_IT/investor-relation/strategy/strategy.shtml
EXPLORATION & PRODUCTION:
Long Term Growth
Increase production, replace reserves and build a
global LNG position
GAS & POWER:
Robust Cash Generation
Grow internationally and preserve Italia gas business
REFINING & MARKET:
Improving Profitability
Enhance refining profitability and marketing network
OPERATIONAL
EFFICIENCY
TECHNOLOGY
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Increasing production, replacing reserves and building a global LNG position
is a typical IOC’s strategy, and it has already been analyzed in the previous
chapters.
Growing internationally and preserving Italy’s gas business is a strategy for
generating cash. In other words, it means selling more, expanding Eni’s
distribution network and finding new markets to place products in.
Generating cash is vital because exploration and production activities require
big capital.
Enhancing refining profitability means developing technologies for
improving production process and reducing its costs. Enhancing marketing
network means expanding operations to areas and products where it is
profitable, and cutting them where they are not profitable.
The two pillars of these strategies are of course operational efficiency and
technology.
So far, Eni’s strategies are similar to any IOC’s strategies, with the usual
emphasis on reserve replacement.
In the past, what could be noticed as a difference between Eni and other
IOCs, was a major propensity to taking risks. At the end of the ‘50ies, Eni
started developing a network in Africa, when no other major wanted to
operate there.
“In Africa, supermajors were relatively weak, because they did not believe
that that continent would have ever reached freedom or economy
development. They did not want to invest anything more than the strictly
necessary for maintaining their plants, often not even that” (free translation
from Marcello Colitti’s “Eni”, 2008, Egea)
About 50% of Eni’s exploration, development and production activities are
concentrated in Africa still today (http://www.eni.it/en_IT/company/
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operations- strategies/ exploration- production/ activities-world/explo-
business-world.shtml).
On the Norwegian Continental Shelf, IOCs have been carrying on few
exploration activities in 2009.  In the period 2006-2009, Esso counts 10
activities, Eni other 10, BP, Conocophillips and Shell 6 each. In the same
period, Statoil has counted 67 and Hydro 36.
(Dagens Næringsliv 02.06.2008 http://www.dn.no/forsiden/ article1
411238.ece)
Goliat is one of the few cases of IOC carrying on exploration activities on the
Norwegian Continental Shelf. It is an example of Eni’s strategy of taking the
initiative and the risk of investing there where other IOCs choose not to. The
reason why Eni differentiates itself from other IOCs is that it was funded and
is based in Italy, a Country without own reserves and without political
connections to reserve holding Countries.
In order to compete with other IOCs, Eni must take bigger risks then them in
explorations and networking with the scope of replacing reserves.
3.5 The relations between competitive strategy and
strategic alliance in ENI
Eni’s use of strategic alliances is a consequence of its strategy, which we
explained in the previous sub-chapter.
As part of its reserve replacement strategy, Eni makes alliances and takes
risk (in exploration activities as Goliat) that other IOCs do not need to take.
Compared to other IOCs, Eni has traditionally been in a disadvantaged
position for resource access and struggled for finding solutions. As the
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development of the network in Africa, also the policy of searching for the
collaboration of producing Countries is simply part of that strategy.
We find an entire paragraph about the importance of partnership for Eni in
the 2006 annual report.
New partnership models and access to oil reserves
Partnerships with producing countries, infrastructure and innovation will
play a basic role in guaranteeing the security of supplies, which is the main
criticality of the world energy system. In fact, at the current state of
knowledge, total recoverable hydrocarbon reserves amount to approximately
5,000 billion barrels and will allow to meet energy requirements for over
100 years.
(…)
Eni is engaged in maintaining high rates of production growth while
guaranteeing the sustainability of its business in the medium- to long-term
through the integral replacement of reserves produced. Eni’s activities are
oriented to the exploration of basins located in Africa, the Barents Sea, the
Middle East and the Gulf of Mexico and to the development of fields with
extended productive life in West Africa, North Africa and Kazakhstan.
(…).
In this context, Eni is constantly engaged in improving its models of
cooperation with producing countries in order to overcome the current
criticalities of the global energy system. Eni’s strategy of cooperation with
producing countries will be characterized by a dialogue with partners. Eni is
ready to promote new strategic alliances with producing countries based on
the joint development of integrated projects aimed at reaching the targets of
energy and economic development set by each country.
From Eni’s annual report 2006, at http://www.eni.it/ attachments/
publications/ reports/reports-2006/annual_2006.pdf
Eni was the first IOC that searched for collaboration with producing
Countries. It can be defined a strategic alliance pioneer.
During the ‘50ies, Eni’s first president Enrico Mattei had the intuition that
Eni could gain competitive advantage developing close connection to
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producer Countries. The new policy Eni introduced should not be seen as an
attempt of fair trade with Countries that at that time, as often also today, were
very poor and did not get any benefit from IOC’s operations, beside payment
of fees.
On the contrary, this new approach was based on a very pragmatic
competitive strategy of Eni’s for sustaining its business and gaining its space
in a market dominated by the supermajors.
 “Mattei understood that in order to ensure Eni, the majors’ “poor cousin”,
a competitive lead, thanks to the atypical features of the oil industry
mentioned above (.i.e, “The oil industry is unique in that a key component of
its production process is bound to run out sooner or later, its resources being
limited rather than unlimited”), an organic link between producing and
consuming countries was needed. Eni should develop closer ties between
production, manufacturing and consumption not defined by the domineering
policy of producing countries.”
From “Eni’s Way, Monografie”, at http:// www.eni.it/ attachments/ media/
magazine/ monographies/ secolo_mattei.pdf
The factor that made the difference between Eni and the other supermajors
was that Eni was the Italian NOC, and that Italy has far too little oil&gas
reserves to sustain Eni’s activity. The other supermajors were American,
English or French, and had easy access to big oil reserves. These supermajors
had an evident competitive advantage consisting in their reserves, and had no
interest in changing a situation where they had easy access to the resources
on their own territory (American IOCs) or in colonies or former colonies.
Eni did not have the same strength. On the contrary, it had a serious
weakness. These internal strength and weakness of Eni’s brought to a
strategic plan aiming to turning its weakness (lack of own oil) into its
strength. It was in this way that Eni started approaching reserve holding
Countries in a collaborative way, and experiencing that partnership in
oil&gas, especially when resources are scarce, gives more benefit and growth
than competition.
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4. Conclusions, limitation and suggestions for further
research
In the oil&gas industry, collaboration brings more benefit and growth than
competition.
IOCs collaborate with local governments through NOCs with the main
purpose of gaining access to important reserves.
A strategic alliance is also the occasion of combining the competence of two
or more companies, helping them to innovate.
Innovation through alliance has also the advantage of being a faster process
than innovation by optimisation of internal resources. In a fast-moving
market like oil&gas, the velocity factor in innovation is a clear competitive
advantage. In the same way as it helps innovation, strategic alliances can
help the development of new products and new networks.
We have not investigated further collaboration between different kinds of
companies than IOC and NOC. Usually, literature mentions these two as
parts joining in alliances. The reason for this is probably that among the
motivations behind IOC-NOC alliances there is the big question of reserve
replacement, which is a crucial one for the entire market, and that is at the
centre of debate at them moment because of the reserve decline at world
level.
Both IOCs and NOCs make alliances with Independent Oil Companies. IOCs
usually do it as a simple form of outsourcing, while NOCs do it because
Independents can be easier to deal with than IOCs. An Independent is a good
provider of technical solutions, very often at the same level as IOCs. “While
the oil majors want to own rights to the reserves they are developing and
take a share of profits in line with market value of the oil produced, oil
services companies are happy to take a fixed fee for the service they provide
and lay no claim to the resources” (KPMG, “Key Issues for Rising National
Oil Companies”, June 2008, page 8). Independent could be a threat for IOCs,
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because they could take away from them the opportunity of making alliances
with NOCs. This could be an interesting subject for further studies.
As a second suggestion, we propose a question about IOC’s investment in
innovation. The fact that Independents are replacing IOCs as partners for
NOCs could suggest that IOCs are losing the competitive advantage of being
competence and/or large-scale leaders. Data showing that IOCs have been
investing less in innovation in the last years can be found easily. This
phenomenon can have different reasons, internal to IOCs or related to an
evolution of NOCs. In any case, it could bring to major changes in the
market.
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6. Appendix
Appendix 1
Elaboration of data from www.npd.no, Norwegian Petroleum Directorate.
Production licences from nr 200 to nr 299, Licensees for each licence sorted
according to the type of owner(s).
The operator is in bold.
Petoro has been considered as a neutral element.
LICENCES WITH ONE TYPE OF OWNER
Licence nr
297 bg norge as    
212c
statoilhydro
petroleum as
212d
statoilhydro
petroleum as
   
213
statoilhydro
petroleum as
   
228
statoilhydro
petroleum as
   
269
statoilhydro
petroleum as
   
256
aker
exploration as
petoro as
rwe dea norge
as
norwegian
energy
company asa
270
endeavour
energy norge
as
vng norge as
rwe dea norge
as
 
274
dong e&p
norge as
bayerngas
produksjon
norge as
wintershall
norge asa
norwegian
energy
company asa
275cs
dong e&p
norge as
bayerngas
produksjon
norge as
wintershall
norge asa
norwegian
energy
company asa
289
dong e&p norge
as
talisman energy
norge as
gdf suez e&p
norge as
faroe petroleum
norge as
299
talisman
energy norge
as
dong e&p norge
as
  
Appendix 1, Table 1, Norwegian Shell licenses 200-299, presence of IOC, NOC and IndOC
separately.
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LICENCES OWNED BY IOC AND NOC
201 eni norge as
statoilhydro
petroleum as
 
209
statoilhydro
petroleum as
petoro as
A/S norske
shell
exxonmobil e&p
norway as
211
total e&p
norge as
statoilhydro
petroleum as
eni norge as
211b
total e&p
norge as
statoilhydro
petroleum as
eni norge as
218
statoilhydro
petroleum as
exxonmobil e&p
norway as
conocophillips
skandinavia as
226
statoilhydro
petroleum as
eni norge as  
227
statoilhydro
petroleum as
eni norge as  
229 eni norge as
statoilhydro
petroleum as
 
229b eni norge as
statoilhydro
petroleum as
 
237 petoro as
statoilhydro
petroleum as
eni norge as total e&p norge as
exxonmobil e&p
norway as
255
A/S norske
shell
petoro as
statoilhydro
petroleum as
total e&p norge as  
257
statoilhydro
petroleum as
exxonmobil e&p
norway as
total e&p norge
as
263c
statoilhydro
petroleum as
total e&p norge
as
petoro as eni norge as
275
total e&p norge
as
conocophilips
skandinavia as
eni norge as
statoilhydro
petroleum as
petoro as
Appendix 1, Table 2, Norwegian Shell licenses 200-299, presence of IOC and NOC.
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LICENCES OWNED BY IOC AND INDEPENDENT OIL COMPANY
203
marathon
petroleum
norge as
conocophilips
skandinavia as
lundin norway
as
208
dong e&p
norge as
petoro as
A/S norske
shell
259 eni norge as
aker exploration
as
 
264 eni norge as
conocophilips
skandinavia as
petoro as
274bs bg norge as
dong e&p norge
as
 
292 bg norge as
lundin norway
as
 
Appendix 1, Table 3, Norwegian Shell licenses 200-299, presence of IOC and IndOC
LICENCES OWNED BY NOC AND INDEPENDENT OIL COMPANY
230
statoilhydro
petroleum as
gdf suez e&p
norge as
  
231
statoilhydro
petroleum as
gdf suez e&p
norge as
  
232
statoilhydro
petroleum as
gdf suez e&p
norge as
  
242
statoilhydro
petroleum as
det norske
oljeselskap
asa
bayerngas
production
norge as
 
248
statoilhydro
petroleum as
petoro as   
248b
statoilhydro
petroleum as
petoro as   
263
statoilhydro
petroleum as
bayerngas
production
norge as
  
263b
statoilhydro
petroleum as
bayerngas
production
norge as
  
265
det norske
oljeselskap asa
statoilhydro
petroleum as
petoro as
talisman energy
norge as
272
statoilhydro
petroleum as
svenska
petroleum
exploration as
det norske
oljeselskalp asa
 
277
statoilhydro
petroleum as
petoro as   
296
statoilhydro
petroleum as
maersk oil
norway as
  
Appendix 1, Table 4, Norwegian Shell licenses 200-299, presence of NOC and IndOC
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LICENCES OWNED BY IOC, NOC AND INDEPENDENT OIL COMPANY
212
statoilhydro
petroleum as
bp norge as
e.on ruhrgas
norge as
pgnig norway
as
  
212b
statoilhydro
petroleum as
bp norge as
e.on ruhrgas
norge as
pgnig norway
as
  
212e
statoilhydro
petroleum as
bp norge as
e.on ruhrgas
norge as
pgnig norway
as
  
219 Eni norge as
statoilhydro
petroleum as
total e&p norge
as
enterprise oil
norge as
  
220
statoilhydro
petroleum as
hess norge as eni norge as    
249
centrica
resources
norge as
statoilhydro
petroleum as
total e&p norge
as
   
250 petoro as
statoilhydro
petroleum as
A/S norske
shell
dong e&p norge
as
exxonmobil e&p
norway as
 
261 bp norge as
rwe dea norge
as
statoilhydro
petroleum as
   
262
statoilhydro
petroleum as
bp norge as
e.on ruhrgas
norge as
pgnig norway
as
  
273
conocophillips
skandinavia as
statoilhydro
petroleum as
wintershall
norge as
idemitsu
petroleum
norge as
dong e&p norge
as
 
281
statoilhydro
petroleum as
e.on ruhrgas
norge as
petoro as
conocophillips
skandinavia as
  
283
statoilhydro
petroleum as
petoro as
conocophillips
skandinavia as
aker exploration
as
chevron norge
as
centrica
resources
norge as
293 Eni norge as
statoilhydro
petroleum as
idemitsu
petroleum
norge as
   
Appendix 1, Table 5, Norwegian Shell licenses 200-299, presence of IOC, NOC and IndOC
59
Appendix 2
Elaboration of data from www.npd.no, Norwegian Petroleum Directorate.
Production licences with presence of Eni.
The operator is in bold.
licence nr eni statoil petoro conocoph total exxonmob others
18 12,3 7,7 5 35,1 39,9    
018b 12,3 7,7 5 35,1 39,9    
44 13,1 30   41,8 15    
62 9,8 45,7 19,9   24,5    
73 5,8 58,7     29,1 6,2  
073b 7,9 58,8     26,6 6,6  
74 29,4 40,8 19,9     9,8  
74b 29,4 40,8 19,9     9,8  
91 7,9 58,1       33  
091b 7,9 59,1       33  
92 14,9 37,4     7,6 40  
94 19,6 40,9 14,9   9,8 14,7  
094b 14,8 34,5 35,6   7,6 7,2  
95 5 10 59 26      
121 14,9 57,4     7,6 20  
122 20 50         30
122b 20 50         30
122c 20 50         30
122d 20 50         30
124 10 35 27 27      
128 11,5 64 24,5        
128b 6,9 39,1 54        
134 30 46,5 13,5   10    
134b 30 64     6    
134c 30 64     6    
145 20     80      
201 67 33          
211 30 30     40    
211b 30 30     40    
219 50 25     15   10
220 15 70         15
226 31 69          
227 31 69          
229 65 35          
229b 65 35          
237 14,8 34,5 35   7,6 7,2  
259 70           30
263c 9,8 45,7 19,9        
264 40   30 30      
275 12,3 7,6 5 35,1 39,8    
293 45 40         15
312 17 59       24  
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323 20 20     40   20
329 40   20       20,10,10
393 30 30 20       20
473 29,4 40,8 20     9,8  
479 19,6 40,9 14,9   9,8 14,7  
489 40 40 20        
514 20 50         30
529 40           20,20,20
532 30 50 20        
533 40           20,20,20
Appendix 2, Table 1, Norwegian Shelf Licences with presence of Eni
